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# FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 37 · NUMBER 1

## Toward an Arab-Israeli Settlement

by Philip C. Jessup

The prospect of continued friction between Israel and the Arab states demands that at long last a new approach should be made to reach an Arab-Israeli settlement. This is not to suggest that a solution of present Arab-Israeli problems will be either easy to achieve or brought about in a short time. What is necessary, however, is that the fundamental issues at stake, some of them highly laden with emotion, be faced squarely and that the many problems involved should be attacked not one by one but as parts of a general settlement.

Such a settlement, moreover, should be sponsored and guaranteed by the United Nations, since it appears utterly impossible for the parties themselves or the great powers outside the Middle East to bring about a settlement. The United Nations is, par excellence, the mechanism most capable of handling this basic problem of the Middle East—neither the United States nor any other state can approach a solution of this issue except by utilizing the procedures of the United Nations. The United Nations came to the United Nations because, in part because Palestine

was a mandate, an area born of an international system, and in part because the United Nations was faced with Britain's decision to relinquish the mandate. In addition, the United Nations has faced the inescapable necessity of dealing with the problems arising out of Israel's existence since that time.

Before any new approach can be made to the Arab-Israeli conflict, however, one prior proposition must be insisted on: that both Israel and the Arab states accept as basic the role of the United Nations in a solution. This acceptance, further, must entail a full willingness to admit the utility of the United Nations Emergency Force, in its present or some modified form, as playing an important role during an interim period on the territory of both sides. But this acceptance would not involve an agreement on any detail of the eventual solution.

In the second place all of the parties concerned must face the fact that Israel exists and will continue to exist. The hostility of the Arab states to Israel, their unwillingness to recognize the new state, their resistance to all suggestions for direct diplomatic negotiations, are well known. Yet much of the talk of the

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obliteration of Israel is for domestic political purposes within certain Arab states. No responsible statesman can believe in it as a legal or political possibility.

It is, in fact, to the disadvantage of the Arab states to pursue this tactic either for propaganda purposes or otherwise. Equally nonproductive is the attitude on Israel's side voiced in the slogan "Nasser must go." Continued emphasis on these attitudes contributes to the welfare of neither Israel nor the Arab states. Rather, in the long run, it is a peaceful adjustment of the relations between the parties concerned which will be to their mutual advantage, and everything which contributes to an intensification or a heightening of tensions and current distrust is against the interest of both parties.

### Problem of Frontiers

Concurrently, it should be clearly understood that Israel cannot expand its territory by force, although, as noted below, this does not mean a freezing of frontiers along the present armistice lines. However, unless the existence of Israel is coupled with the idea that its forceful expansion is out of the question, no solid basis will exist for final solutions.

It appears clear, third, that the present armistice lines must be adjusted and permanent frontiers established. Only minor changes would be involved here, not extensive alterations. Adjustments are needed of present arrangements which are advantageous to neither one side nor the other. Some of the present armi-

stice lines were drawn, as was true of the 38th Parallel in Korea, for what was hoped to be a temporary period. They were not planned as permanent boundaries.

### The Arab Refugees

The fourth basic consideration which must be taken into account in a settlement concerns the Arab refugees. This question must be faced in terms of compensation, restoration or other kinds of indemnity. Doubtless, different solutions will be needed with regard to different groups of the refugees. International financing measures may also be needed in dealing with this problem, a matter on which the United States has indicated its willingness to cooperate. Surely, however, it is recognized that this great mass of displaced people constitutes one of the most dangerous elements in the area. The problem cannot be ignored, but must be settled.

Fifth, it appears clear that the Jordan Valley and other water resources of the area must be developed. This development should take place under United Nations auspices and must be planned on technical and not on political lines. Discussions in the past few years have resulted in some measure of agreement on such a development program. But final adjustment of the vital water issues between the parties appears to be possible only as part of a general settlement. Past disputes over development of water resources have amply illustrated the impossibility of reaching agreement on isolated problems when

hostility and conflict exist and are used as excuses for not dealing with fundamentals.

Sixth, a settlement must also deal with arrangements regarding the holy places in the area, a matter of intense importance to many as evidenced in the earlier discussions of the Palestine issue in the United Nations. The question of Jerusalem aside, a guarantee of access to all holy places is needed. Again, a solution appears by no means impossible on this issue if it is part of a general settlement.

Seventh, guarantees of free passage through the Suez Canal, the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are also required. In addition, a general settlement might establish the right of passage across the Negev for the Arab states and provide the interior Arab states with free port arrangements on the Mediterranean.

### A New Approach

In approaching these most vital issues, as well as others, the various parties concerned should not be forced to make public admissions about this, that or the other element of the settlement. On many occasions in international politics the last thing one can secure is a public statement about some proposition. Where it may be quite feasible to induce a certain line of action, for domestic, political or other reasons it may be impossible for a government to announce publicly the acceptance of a principle which is actually being followed.

A new approach toward a general

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settlement can perhaps best be initiated within the United Nations by the United States and India. Usually such initiative has been taken by the chief Western powers, but the broad settlement suggested here would hardly be achieved in that way. The United States and India could present a joint point of view of a Western power and an Eastern power. Such an approach appears politically feasible, although one obstacle to India's participation might arise; for reasons growing out of the Kashmir dispute, India might raise objections to the employment of the United Nations Emergency Force except with the full consent of the parties on whose territory it is to be stationed.

### Commissions Suggested

Such a joint resolution when presented in the United Nations General Assembly should not propose any substantive solutions to the various issues noted above. Nor should there be any implication that a solution will be imposed. Rather the resolution should suggest a number of procedures for attacking the various problems. Thus a series of commissions should be established. One of them would be a Frontier Commission to study the delimitation of the frontiers. A second would be a Financial Commission, which might deal with the problem of the refugees and perhaps with the financing of water development. A third would be a Technical Commission on the development of the water resources. The Financial Commission could utilize the statistics already collected by the Land Identification Office of the United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission.

These commissions would, in turn, report to the General Assembly. Perhaps a year, two years or more would pass before something approaching a comprehensive solution emerges.

When it does emerge, the General Assembly, again under United States-Indian sponsorship, should resolve that this settlement would be the one to be guaranteed by the United Nations. The Assembly would call upon all states to cooperate in the maintenance of that settlement and might well call upon the members individually, to offer individual guarantees of the settlement.

The resolution of the General Assembly should further provide that the United Nations Emergency Force would remain in being and patrol all frontiers until such time as the final over-all solution appears to be accepted. It must be remembered that the border raids, which are perhaps an inevitably tragic part of the disturbed situation between Israel and the Arab states, have been launched from both one side and the other, and judgments of the United Nations organs have condemned both sides for such forays across the borders. There is probably no possibility of eliminating this constant incitement to further hostility and bitterness except through the patrol of the newly created United Nations Emergency Force.

### Role of General Assembly

Whether the approach suggested here is outside the powers of the General Assembly will inevitably be debated should the above process be undertaken. Yet it is but necessary to recall the development of the American Constitution, especially the early attitudes taken by John Marshall, to realize that many principles of our constitutional system now fully established and accepted were evolved in practice. So, too, we have recently seen a tremendous constitutional evolution within the United Nations, particularly in regard to the activities of the General Assembly. The history of the Palestine question itself

reflects such a development, for many doubted whether the Assembly was legally exercising only its original powers in proposing the partition of Palestine.

The early Palestine resolutions set a precedent for cooperative action by the General Assembly and the Security Council concurrently grappling with different aspects of the same problem. Since the adoption of the 'Uniting for Peace Resolution', the General Assembly has emerged as the UN body which must be looked to for broad political decisions on questions affecting the peace of the world.

### A Reasonable Solution

A solution of Arab-Israeli differences will not be found through negotiations between the parties, nor by one side conquering the other. Neither will it be found by one side conceding the points of view of the other. It will not be found by seeking to elicit in advance from the parties agreement on parts of the eventual solution. It will be found only through reaching a settlement which is not arbitrary, perhaps not one which gives full satisfaction to both sides but which is reasonable and is achieved by a fair process. Once such a settlement is drawn up by the United Nations and insisted on by the great powers on both sides of the world, it would seem possible to look forward to a solution of the disturbed relations between the Arab states and Israel.

This article is based on a speech made by Mr. Jessup at the American Jewish Committee in New York on April 11, 1957. Mr. Jessup is the Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at Columbia University, New York City, and the author of several books on international law, the latest being *Transnational Law* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1956). From 1949 to 1953 Mr. Jessup was Ambassador at Large, and between 1948 and 1953 he represented the United States in numerous sessions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly of the United Nations.



## Is the UN in Our National Interest?

by Clark M. Eichelberger

Clark M. Eichelberger is executive director of the American Association for the United Nations. During World War II he was a consultant to the Department of State, serving on the committee which prepared the first American working draft of the UN Charter. He was a consultant to the United States Delegation at San Francisco in 1945.

**T**HE United Nations is absolutely essential to our national interest.

What is the national interest? Certainly it is survival as a free nation; freedom from the constant fear of destruction and the need of exhausting military preparedness to avoid it; an opportunity to enjoy an expanding spiritual and physical well-being. Others may equate the national interest in terms of power to dominate others. But reasonable men would believe that the qualities just outlined are the legitimate aspirations of a nation.

The means of guaranteeing the national interest must be consistent with the world in which we live. The means of destruction today are worldwide. Either of the two atomic giants has enough nuclear bombs to destroy life on this planet. The world is so integrated that a shock anywhere is felt everywhere.

What are the choices? One is an improvisation of policy to protect our national interests in terms of shifting power, temporary alliances, and all of the devices that have come close to destroying the modern world in the first half of this century. The other choice is United States participation in an organized community of nations, nearly universal, based upon law and moral standards. These standards must constantly be strengthened, refined and enforced by an ever-developing international political and juridical machinery capable of providing nations with an opportunity to air their grievances and to adjust their difficulties. The material and spiritual prosperity which must accompany our survival

as a free nation demands a community spirit of mutual helpfulness and machinery to advance justice, human rights, and economic and social betterment.

### Value of the UN

The United Nations has made the difference between the uneasy peace in which we live and a war of catastrophic proportions which has been avoided. Young though it is, it has absorbed the terrible shocks of Suez, Kashmir, Korea and Palestine. It has localized conflicts. It has safeguarded peace.

Without the United Nations the world might not have withstood the impact of the revolt against colonialism. The organization helped some of the new nations to independence; furnished a forum where the voice of freedom could be raised; and welcomed these new states into the family of nations. For 700 million people to attain freedom from colonialism in 13 years is one of the greatest revolutionary facts of history. This freedom has to be achieved, safeguarded and expressed in an orderly world.

The United Nations is essential to another phase of our national interest—our capacity to enjoy an expanding spiritual and physical prosperity.

The value of an agency for the peacetime use of atomic energy, as proposed by President Eisenhower on December 8, 1953, was described by the secretary-general of the United Nations, who said: "The demonstration of the will of nations to act in concert for the development of atomic energy for the common good

gives reason for hope that the second industrial revolution, soon perhaps within reach, will be free from several of the weaknesses which cast their shadow on the industrial revolution of the past century."

In the program of mutual helpfulness and technical assistance through the United Nations and its specialized agencies, a spirit of kindness is developing which is something above power politics and national self-interest, although it has everything to do with higher self-interest.

Speaking against an organized world community, of which the United Nations is the beginning, there are those who speak with nostalgia of balance of power, alliances and national self-interest in a world of accepted antagonism.

What do these critics say about the United Nations? Since their program looks only to the short-sighted advantage of the moment, they criticize the United Nations because the General Assembly has insisted that the British, French and Israelis evacuate Egypt, and thus, they assert, weakened the Western alliance. Furthermore, they say that the United Nations has a double standard because it did not accomplish Soviet withdrawal from Hungary. And from there they go on to the fact that the General Assembly includes some 70-odd nations who are not great powers but whose votes outweigh those of the great powers.

The answers are clear. It is to American national interest to develop a system of international law and order, and we cannot make an excep-

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by Hans J. Morgenthau

Professor Morgenthau, director of the Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy at the University of Chicago, has taught law, history and political science at many leading United States and foreign universities. In the spring of 1957 he lectured at the University of Madrid. His latest book is *Politics Among Nations* (N.Y., Knopf, 1954).

**T**O ASK whether the United Nations is in the national interest of the United States is like asking whether diplomatic negotiations or military alliances are in the national interest of the United States. The answer is bound to be that sometimes they are and sometimes they are not.

The UN, seen from the vantage point of the United States, is as much an instrument of American foreign policy as are diplomatic negotiations and alliances, and these instruments must be continuously subjected to the pragmatic test of their usefulness for the national purposes which the United States happens to pursue at the moment. It is no more sensible to approve the UN *per se* as "good" for the United States, or to condemn it as "bad," than it would be to pass such an *a priori* judgment upon any other instrumentality of United States foreign policy.

While circumstances must determine the usefulness of the United Nations for the United States, the intrinsic capabilities of the organization set limits to the circumstances. Whether to use a knife or a fork depends on circumstances, but the fact that knives and forks are suited only for certain purposes and not for others limits from the outset the choice of circumstances. What, then, are the purposes the UN is capable of serving, and what are the circumstances under which the United States might profitably avail itself of its services?

The political purposes which the United Nations is able to serve, by virtue of its Charter and its political dynamics, are four: great power gov-

ernment, General Assembly government, diplomatic negotiations, and propaganda. The Charter intends the UN to be a government of the great powers operating through the Security Council. But because the cold war destroyed the unity of the great powers upon which this government was predicated, and the Security Council is paralyzed by the Russian veto, the General Assembly, through the Uniting for Peace Resolution and extensive interpretations of the Charter, has taken over some of the governmental functions the Security Council was supposed to discharge. Aside from performing these formal constitutional functions, the UN provides a neutral meeting ground for diplomats to carry on the traditional business of diplomacy. Finally, it offers a platform, visible to the world, on which statesmen can engage in the struggle for the minds of men.

### Functions of the UN

Little needs to be said, in view of the national interest of the United States, about the first, third and fourth of these functions. The importance of great power government lies at present in its existence as a legal possibility, of which both the United States and the Soviet Union might avail themselves at some future time with regard, for instance, to the paramount problem confronting both: the supranational control of atomic weapons. The United States has used the United Nations continuously to carry on diplomatic negotiations and propaganda. While one might have sometimes wished it had carried on more of the former and

less of the latter, these activities do not raise a fundamental problem for the conduct of American foreign policy.

Such a problem, however, is posed by the second function: government by the General Assembly. During the first decade of the United Nations it was the United States which benefited from that government because the United States could muster the necessary two-thirds majority in support of the policies it wished to carry out through the instrumentality of the General Assembly. The culmination of this period was the UN collective action in support of United States intervention in the Korean war.

The admission of 20-odd new members to the UN has drastically altered this distribution of voting strength. The United States and its allies can no longer rely on a two-thirds majority to support their policies, while the combined Asian-African and Soviet blocs can. In consequence, the relationship between the national interest of the United States and UN measures taken through the General Assembly has been reversed. The United States now faces the risk that such measures will run counter to its interests. Its best chance to protect its interests no longer lies in marshaling a two-thirds majority to their support, but rather in preventing such a majority from forming against them.

Consequently, the United States will in the future have to use considerable discrimination in deciding whether or not it serves its interests to have the General Assembly deal with a certain issue. It was exactly this lack of discrimination, strengthened by the popular tendency to assume for the processes of the UN a kind of natural superiority over national policies, which some observers

found objectionable in the policies which the United States pursued during the Suez crisis of November 1956. This tendency, while always wrong intellectually, was politically tolerable as long as the UN was likely to be a weapon in the hands of the United States rather than in those of its enemies. With that relationship reversed, a discriminating and unemotional intelligence is more necessary than ever in our approach to the United Nations.

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tion of our friends any more than they should make an exception of us if the situation were reversed. The United Nations condemnation of Soviet policy in Hungary is the most severe indictment of a nation, great or small, ever made by the international community. Wisdom must be used in developing the General Assembly into an effective, well-bal-

anced parliamentary system. American policy, if based on right, can be as effective in a General Assembly of 81 nations as it was in the General Assembly of 60 nations.

The overwhelming task of developing the United Nations system requires an act of faith. But the alternatives would mean destruction. We must continue on the great adventure of developing an international community through those processes begun in the United Nations.



## FPA Bookshelf

### STUDIES ON THE UN

A series of studies concerning the United Nations, begun in 1951 by The Brookings Institution under the direction of the late Dr. Leo Pasvolksy, now includes the following volumes: *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security*, by Leland M. Goodrich and Anne P. Simons (1955, \$6.00); *Proposals for Changes in the United Nations*, by Francis O. Wilcox and Carl M. Marcy (1955, \$5.00); *The United Nations and Dependent Peoples*, by Emil J. Sady (1956, \$1.50); *The United Nations and Economic and Social Cooperation*, by Robert E. Asher and others (1957, \$2.50); *The United Nations and Human Rights*, by James F. Green (1956, \$1.50). Other volumes in the series will cover such topics as the history of the UN Charter, the United States and the future of the UN, and regional security and the UN.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is also engaged in publishing a series of volumes on the UN. These are reports prepared in view of the forthcoming review of the UN Charter which has been approved in principle by the Security Council and the General Assembly. In most instances these volumes have been prepared in cooperation with the Endowment by Institutes of International Affairs in the selected countries. The reports deal briefly with the history of national attitudes, both governmental and nongovernmental, toward international organization. National attitudes toward the founding of the UN, its subsequent developments, and opinions and proposals for changing the Charter are also included. To date the following volumes have been issued: *Canada and the United Nations*, prepared for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs by F. H. Soward and Edgar McInnis with the assistance of Walter O'Hearn (1956); *Den-*

*Sorensen and Niels J. Haagerup* (1956); *Israel and the United Nations*, a report of a Study Group set up by the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (1956); *La Suisse et Les Nations Unies*, by Jacqueline Belin, under the direction of Paul Guggenheim (1956); *Sweden and the United Nations*, a report by a Special Study Group of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (1956); and *India and the United Nations*, a report of a Study Group set up by The Indian Council of World Affairs (1957). All these books are priced at \$3.00.

*Everyman's United Nations*. New York, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1956. \$1.50.

Perhaps the best one volume compendium of information on the aims, structure and work of the United Nations, this book, the fifth revised edition, covers the first decade of the UN. Developments within the Specialized Agencies of the UN are also included.

*Soviet Russia in China*, by Chiang Kai-shek. New York, Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957. \$5.00.

In part autobiography, in part the history of China's role in the modern world, this book was written by the president of the Republic of China in the "earnest hope that the bitter lessons China has learned may prove instructive to countries and governments, and especially those in Asia which now face the threat of communism." Chiang touches on his kidnapping during the Sian incident and gives his views on Stilwell, Wedemeyer, Hurley and General Marshall.

*Democracy in England*, by Diana Spearman. London, Rockliff, 1957. 30s (\$4.20).

Mrs. Spearman, a lifelong student of politics who has twice stood for Parliament, says: "We have gradually slid from the

original conception of a government with limited powers and of citizens with rights that could not be infringed to the idea of the unlimited sovereignty of the majority." She then examines the history of democracy in England and its effect on the nature of democracy today. The book presents a thoughtful and interesting treatise.

*Sultan in Oman: Venture into the Middle East*, by James Morris. New York, Pantheon, 1957. \$3.50.

Published in the spring of 1957, a few weeks before the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman attracted world-wide attention, this book is described by the publisher as an account of a venture which "reflects, as in a microcosm, the great political, economic and social forces of the time." It is a London Times reporter's story of his experience as he traveled into the interior of Oman with the sultan's expedition against the 1955 uprising led by the Iman of Oman—a dress rehearsal of the 1957 revolt. An engrossing adventure story, ably and objectively interpreted by the highly perceptive author of the popular book *As I Saw the U.S.A.*

*Diversity of Worlds*, by Raymond Aron and August Heckscher. New York, Reynal, 1957. \$3.50.

A penetrating analysis of the differing attitudes taken by France and America toward the demanding problems of the 20th century and their effects on the North Atlantic community. The book developed from discussions held in 1956 at Arden House, New York, between American and French scholars and public opinion leaders. The first part of the book is written by Raymond Aron, political scientist and noted political contributor to *Figaro*, and the second part is by August Heckscher, director of The Twentieth Century Fund.

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## The Economy Drive—Two Views

Before Congress ended its recent session on August 30 both it and the White House were bent on economizing, but on different programs. The President sought to cut defense costs under the suspicious eye of the Congress, and Capitol Hill cut the foreign aid program, much to the dismay of the Administration.

The White House, or more specifically the Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, who is about to retire, gave his military assistants a real shocker recently by announcing he was trimming their current spending rate by some \$2.2 billion this year. And then, before they had a chance to recover from the blow, he announced that he was reversing their budget-making procedure.

In the past the service chiefs have been allowed to ask for what they wanted or felt was necessary for national defense, however astronomical. Then the Secretary and budget bureau director would trim the request before submitting it to Congress. Now, however, the service chiefs are being given a ceiling under which they must do their planning.

Actually the White House economies, deep as is the dollar cut in the new defense program, are not as severe as they look. The fact is the armed services have been spending money at a faster and faster rate and would have run out of money weeks, if not months, before the fiscal year was up. This was due to increased costs and to the fact that new weapons are proving more costly than expected. But whatever the cause, a situation was emerging in which the President would either have no more defense money next June and July or have to ask Congress for supplementary appropriations.

He might do the latter, except for one irritating fact: the national debt is so near the debt ceiling set by Congress that defense spending at the present rate would put it over the top. And the Administration is extremely shy of asking Congress to raise the debt ceiling; its dream is to balance the budget, produce a surplus and halt inflation. So it has chosen rather to cut costs and keep within the debt limit.

### Fear of Inflation

It justifies this approach on two grounds. One, a spending spiral means inflation, and inflation means danger to the national economy; and any threat to the economy is a threat to the nation's security. Two, the world situation (despite the problem of Syria) is easier than it was six months or a year ago—the Suez crisis is over, so is the Jordanian affair, also Hungary, and then there are signs of Soviet preoccupation with domestic matters. There are more than a few capital observers and Administration critics who do not agree with the President's analysis of the global situation or with his economic approach to national defense. But the President himself is convinced of the rightness of his approach to defense and economy.

The congressional attack on the foreign aid bill was something else again. As compared with the nearly \$4.5 billion asked for by President Eisenhower last January, later reduced to \$3.8 billion, Congress settled on the sum of \$3.4 billion just before adjournment. Both the House and Senate swung the economy ax with vigor if not relish. And they did

so, not from fear of inflation or satisfaction with the international picture, but from a conviction that certain funds from previous appropriations, committed but not yet used, would be available; that foreign aid had about outgrown its usefulness; and that the people are fed up with it. After a decade of spending billions to restore the economies of America's allies, to build up their defenses, to supply them with arms, Congressmen feel the time has come to noticeably reduce and eventually end such foreign assistance. Yet the President's aid bill, rather than making foreign aid a temporary thing, sought to establish it on a semipermanent basis. The Administration hoped that all military costs might be shifted to the defense budget and swallowed up in its much larger total and that economic aid be put largely into a Development Fund that would be self-perpetuating. Congress, however, rejected the first request and provided only for a temporary loan fund.

The Administration, of course, believes that a dollar for foreign aid is two dollars saved in other ways. Also the Administration sees its whole system of alliances, which encircles the globe, collapsing if the United States fails to adequately underwrite it annually with considerable military hardware and support items.

Such disputes over economy measures are not a unique situation in the capital. But the outcome on the foreign aid bill also means that the Administration next year must present its case for aid all over again.

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## FPA Bookshelf

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*Nationalism in Colonial Africa*, by Thomas Hodgkin. New York, New York University Press, 1957. \$3.75.

With the rise of new nation-states in Africa and the upsurge of nationalism throughout the continent, new studies of the "colonial problem" are in order. In this book, Mr. Hodgkin, lecturer and writer on African affairs, surveys, not the older problems of administration and international competition with respect to Africa, but the new social, economic and institutional relationships which are emerging. Of interest are his notes on the development of new classes and the revival of pre-European-colonial traditions.

*The Twentieth Century*, by Hans Kohn. New York, Macmillan, 1957. New and enlarged edition. \$4.50.

In this book the author, an authority on nationalism, deals with the ideas which are, for good or ill, dominant in the mid-20th century—communism, fascism, democracy, nationalism and others. First published at the end of World War II, the book has been enlarged to deal especially with the changes evident in communism and the rapid rise of non-Western nationalism.

*American-Asian Tensions*, edited by Robert Strausz-Hupé and others. New York, Praeger, 1956. \$3.75.

One of the series of studies of the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, this book defines "tensions" as a reflection of the pursuit of incompatible foreign policy objectives. Its development ranges over the tensions which exist between the United States and five other countries: India, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines and Egypt.

*National Communism and Soviet Strategy*, by D. A. Tomasic. Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1957. \$4.50.

Dealing with Titoism in Yugoslavia as the prototype of emerging "national communism" in Eastern Europe, the author, Dr. Tomasic, a former Yugoslav official and now professor of sociology and of Eastern

European studies at Indiana University, raises the important issue of whether successful Titoism will lead to a disintegration of Soviet power in the satellite areas or whether it is but a calculated part of the strategy and tactics of revolutionary communism in line with Leninist teachings.

*Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost*, by Bertram D. Wolfe. New York, Praeger, 1957. \$3.95.

This book presents an exhaustive analysis of the speech attacking Stalin made by the first secretary of the Communist party in Russia in February 1956. Noting the reverberations of the speech on the development of communism both in the Soviet Union and abroad, Mr. Wolfe, the long-time student of Russian affairs, develops the thesis that Stalin's successors are guilty as Stalin was guilty of the crimes detailed in the speech and guilty, too, of perpetuating the dictatorship evolved by him.

*The Red Army*, edited by B. H. Liddell Hart. New York, Harcourt, 1956. \$6.00.

With the recent elevation of the top Soviet military official to a ranking position in the Communist party hierarchy of the Soviet Union, there is added reason, if any were needed, to understand the history, aims and power of the Soviet army. This book attempts to survey that army in all of its aspects. It is edited by the British military analyst and historian, Liddell Hart, and includes contributions of many others from various countries who have specialized in the study of particular facets of the Soviet army.

*Diplomacy in a Democracy*, by Henry M. Wriston. New York, Harper, 1956. \$2.50.

Dr. Wriston, President Emeritus of Brown University, here develops a cogent answer to those who believe that democracies, and the United States in particular, do not operate effectively on the diplomatic front. The author, who was also consultant to the Secretary of State on the reorganization of the Foreign Service, gives much consideration to its problems in this book.

*Communism in Latin America*, by Robert J. Alexander. New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1957. \$9.00.

This comprehensive and detailed review,

the first of its kind, of the growth of communism in Latin America is a major contribution to the study of both Latin America and the international Communist movement. Based in part on personal study and observation, the author has presented material drawn from interviews with key figures involved in Communist-dominated parties in various countries.

*Journey of an American*, by Albion Ross. Indianapolis and New York, Bobbs, 1957. \$4.50.

The gifted and sensitive *New York Times* foreign correspondent, Albion Ross, has written in this book of his quest over a generation to plumb the meaning of mid-20th century living in a world often chaotic but seemingly on the verge of new beginnings. The new freedom he has sought will be a "freedom of clearly recognized and gladly accepted interdependence." The author has traveled and reported throughout the globe, and his narrative adds historical and philosophical interpretations to his autobiography.

*Pagan Spain*, by Richard Wright. New York, Harper, 1957. \$4.00.

In this unusual and often poetic book on Spain Richard Wright, the American novelist and journalist now living in Paris, seeks for the inner reality of the Spanish people. Wright believes that at its core the Spanish paradox is religious; the people are almost exclusively Catholic, but through their customs, festivals, even the bull ring, show evidence also of harboring a primitive faith.

*Population Growth and Levels of Consumption*, by Horace Belshaw. New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1956. \$4.50.

This study, based on the experience of the New Zealand economist Dr. Belshaw's varied work in underdeveloped areas, analyses the relationship between population growth and levels of consumption, especially with reference to the countries of Asia. The author deals with the importance of that relationship and turns his attention also to noneconomic problems—the whole range of social developments which inevitably accompany economic change.

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